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  Abstract 
 Privacy, its violations and techniques to bypass privacy violation have grabbed the centre-stage of both 
academia and industry in recent months. Corporations worldwide have become conscious of the implications 
of privacy violation and its impact on them and to other stakeholders. Moreover, nations across the world 
are coming out with privacy protecting legislations to prevent data privacy violations. Such legislations 
however expose organizations to the issues of intentional or unintentional violation of privacy data. A 
violation by either malicious external hackers or by internal employees can expose the organizations to 
costly litigations. In this paper, we propose PRIVDAM; a data mining based intelligent architecture of a 
Privacy Violation Detection and Monitoring system whose purpose is to detect possible privacy violations 
and to prevent them in the future. Experimental evaluations show that our approach is scalable and robust 




The area of privacy enhancement technologies has seen tremendous growth in the last couple of 
years. This is mainly due to the enactment of privacy legislations and the wide-spread use of the 
Internet and its inherent weakness in the protection of the privacy of individuals as well as 
organizations. Till date, most of these technologies have focused on privacy middleware [1] and on 
privacy policy expression 0 . Moreover, research on the detection of privacy violation and the 
proactive determination of privacy violation patterns to prevent future privacy violation is sparse, if 
  1not non-existent. Consequently, there is a gaping requirement for a method to automate the 
detection of privacy violations 0. 
 
The need of a privacy violation prevention mechanism becomes evident whenever organizations 
deal with Personal Identifiable Information. With the increase in the amounts of personal data 
being collected, stored and processed in information systems, the threat of violation of individual 
privacy and consequent commercial damage to large enterprises is on the increase. Moreover, 
control over personal information has also decreased as individuals are unaware of which systems 
store their information and what all has been stored. Sensitive data, such as detailed transaction 
summaries including social security number, shipping and billing addresses, e-mail id and credit 
card details are being put to risk on a routine basis [19]. 
 
The issue of privacy violation detection is tricky since any violation detection has to be done on the 
log created by the privacy middleware. The creation of this log itself can be a privacy violation as it 
captures information about individuals that they may not want to be stored. This information might 
include the individual’s surfing history and his data-access patterns, using which, one can build 
back personally identifiable information about the individual. Previous work in this area includes 
the minimization of the identity information of a user and the employment of techniques like 
anonymisation and pseudonymisation of log files. This paper ignores this issue of privacy violation 
due to maintenance of a log and focuses primarily on using the log for Privacy Violation Detection 
(PVD) 0. 
 
Privacy violations are defined as events that breach a privacy policy or an agreement between a 
customer (data subject) and the data collecting entity. Generally, an individual's privacy can be 
protected in two ways, either by minimizing the amount of personal data stored, or by enforcing 
privacy policies.  
 
As defined by Tina Hermandsen Krekke 0, a Privacy Violation Detector (PVD) aims at detecting 
such privacy violations.  
 
In this paper, we introduce the implementation of a Privacy Violation Detection and Monitoring 
system that we have termed PRIVDAM. PRIVDAM uses a suite of machine learning techniques 
for automated identification of malicious violations and may be a part of a system that enforces 
  2privacy policies. We use the system described in [1] as the basis on top of which the work in this 
paper has been done. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the motivation behind 
creating such a system. Section 3 describes related work previously done in intrusion detection 
systems as well as privacy violation detection. In Section 4, a privacy broker from our earlier work 
is discussed which is used to enforce the privacy policy in the database. Section 5 presents an 
anomaly based PRIVDAM architecture using two data mining techniques. Section 6 describes the 
implementation of PRIVDAM for a hospital situation and section 7 presents the results. 
 
Finally we conclude with experimental results and make a few suggestions for future research 
work. 
 
2  Motivation behind PRIVDAM 
We have conceptualized PRIVDAM as not just a reactive protection mechanism but also an 
intelligent, proactive one: it is designed to detect privacy violations and learn from such violations 
so as to prevent their future occurrences. However, this system does not propose to replace the role 
of the human analysts but simply attempts to reduce their burden. 
 
The need for such a system arises from the fact that vast amounts of data being processed and 
collected have the potential to become a privacy nightmare in the near future. A few organizations 
and corporations have a privacy policy enforcement mechanism in place 00, but no systems exist 
for monitoring and detecting the violations that might occur. Users come across hundreds of 
privacy policies while visiting various websites, but very few of these privacy policies are actually 
enforced using automated systems. Moreover, assuming the presence of automated privacy 
violations, there may not be many systems that would have preventive measures for stopping 
violations. We have termed programs that enable automated privacy violations as Leeches since 
they leech out the data. This is especially true for high valued information like credit card 
information. Recently a major credit card provider’s data was compromised and this put an 
estimated 40 million customers at risk 0. This risk includes exposure of the individual to fraud, 
identity theft while it makes the enterprise susceptible to costly legal liabilities 0. 
 
  3There are numerous issues that are adding to the problem of privacy violation: like personal data 
driven e-businesses which are highly motivated towards exploiting personal information; 
negligence to security and continual technological glitches and an ever increasing community of 
malicious hackers who want to gain from the situation 0. New bills are being tabled by law-makers 
to set standards for companies handling sensitive consumer data 0 but until specialized and 
effective privacy protection systems are put into place, it will be difficult to implement and monitor 
compliance to the privacy legislations. 
 
With increased consumer awareness even a single privacy violation can lead to costly lawsuits. 
Businesses want customers to have trust in their institutions and approximately $15 billion dollars 
is lost every year by e-businesses due to the intensifying mistrust 0. A cable giant, an airline carrier 
and a major toy manufacturer were all involved in lawsuits over alleged privacy violations 000, 
which cost these enterprises millions of dollars in settlement fees and lost revenues and goodwill. 
 
We believe that just as network intrusions occur despite network access controls being put into 
place 0000 similarly, privacy violations will happen despite the traditional policy based privacy 
violation prevention mechanisms being put into place. 
 
Moreover, once the information is leaked, misuse cannot be prevented, detected or even rolled back 
and this is the driving factor behind stopping the access before it causes a privacy violation. In the 
following subsections, we will discuss about the existing classification of perpetrators and 
scenarios of privacy violations. 
2.1  Classification of perpetrators  
The notations used for various categories of attackers are 0: 
 
  External Users: Nefarious attackers trolling the net trying to hack their way into the network. 
These users are ignorant of the privacy policies and the internal infrastructure and form the 
unauthorized class. 
  Regular Employees: Malicious users who have intimate knowledge and inside information 
about the privacy policy as well as the network. They employ subterfuge to overcome their 
lack of security credentials to access the privacy data. They have to employ illegal hacking to 
access the information. 
  4  Misfeasors: Insidious users who have the required security credentials. They are probably the 
most detrimental as they abuse their power and position to access and use information that they 
are not supposed to. Misfeasors are also employees like in the above category but the 
difference lies in the fact that they do not have to resort to any illegal hacking to access 
sensitive data. 
 
Obviously, preventing privacy violations by misfeasors is a considerably difficult, if not impossible 
task. This paper focuses on privacy violations by External Users and Regular Employees. 
2.2  Possible scenarios of privacy violations 
Even if one can construct privacy middleware that ensure that all data requests comply with the 
privacy policies, it will not prevent masqueraders and misfeasors from accessing the data by 
various techniques 0. 
2.2.1  Hacking Attempts 
A person gets to know the login/password and/or gets access to the privacy policy that is defined in 
the system either by hacking it or by social engineering methods and therefore assumes the identity 
of a genuine user or changes the privacy policy such that the person gets access to privacy 
constrained data. For example, a hacker can break into a hospital’s network and sell the patient 
records to a medical insurance company, enabling the insurance company to provide medical 
insurance cover at discriminatory process based on detailed health records of individuals.  
2.2.2  Treacherous employees 
A regular authorized user makes changes to the privacy policy and accesses information he was not 
supposed to. An example of such a behavior would be the case taken up by Agarwal et al. 0 of a 
malicious internal user, Mallory while discussing Hippocratic databases. Mallory is an employee 
with questionable ethics who can retrieve customer records in off peak hours and can potentially 
sell them to any rival company. This will cause loss of revenue as well as potential lawsuits by 
customers. 
2.2.3  Technical faults 
The system can be infected with malicious codes like a virus or a worm. They can be made to send 
confidential information to outside systems through unsupervised ports. We term such codes as 
Leeches since they leech out the data. Backdoors or loopholes can exist which are a result of badly 
  5configured security systems. They can be used surreptitiously to bypass the normal logging and 
auditing mechanisms. 
2.2.4  Denial of Service 
A DoS attack, in terms of privacy, would lead to the violation of the privacy principle of 
information, notification and access rights of the data subjects 0, 0. Data subjects have the right to 
information, to notification and the right to correction, erasure or blocking of incorrect or illegally 
stored data. A Denial of Service attack violates privacy by impinging on the right to access one’s 
own information. 
 
A crucial yet unrelated form of privacy violation is breaking the confidentiality agreement between 
two parties. An organization might agree to a non-disclosure agreement but might not adhere to it 
and sell the information to a third party for illegitimate gain. Sending unsolicited spam mails might 
be the motive behind such a crime. 
 
3 Related  Work 
 
While discussing Hippocratic databases 0, a Query Intrusion Detector has been proposed which 
runs on the query results to spot queries whose access patterns is different from the usual access 
patterns. However, this is similar to the misuse detection approach in Intrusion Detection Systems 
and is hence would be unable to detect new attacks whose nature is unknown.  
 
Strawman architecture of a Privacy Violation Detection system has also been discussed in Tina 
Hermandsen Krekke’s thesis 0 . However, the work does not go beyond the strawman architecture 
and does not include any implementation. Moreover it is not extended to malicious hackers and is 
somewhat limited to the employees who attempt to gain additional privileges for which they are not 
authorized, or employees who misuse the privileges given to them, i.e. due to accidental disclosure, 
insider curiosity and insubordination. 
3.1  Privacy Violation Detection V/s Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion Detection Systems have been extensively studied 0 and they have been classified 
according to their granularity of data processing, source of audit data, detection methods, response 
to detected intrusions, security, degree of interoperability, manageability, adaptability and network 
infrastructure requirements. 
  6Protecting the infrastructure from external unauthorized access is a security issue whereas the 
protection of individual’s information from intentional or unintentional abuse of authorized access 
is a privacy issue. This thought can be exemplified by the disparity between privacy and security. 
Privacy pertains to an individual’s information whereas security pertains to the enterprise 
information access and is focused on the enterprise systems. 
 
However, security and privacy are also weakly co-related. In most cases, privacy requires security, 
but sometimes security functions may hinder or actually be a cause of privacy violations e.g. 
intrusion detection systems and logging. This is called the Security-Privacy Paradox 0. 
  
PRIVDAM borrows some of the learning from Intrusion Detection Systems 00000. However as 
privacy is inherently different from security, our architecture has some novel features that support 
privacy violation detection. They will be discussed in detail in Section 5. 
3.2  P3P Policy Specification Language 
Considerable work has been done in creating standards for specifying a website’s privacy policy. 
The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) provides a standard to websites to 
communicate their data practices 0. It provides the syntax and semantics of privacy policies and the 
mechanisms for associating policies with Web resources. It includes machine-readable privacy 
policy syntax that web browsers and other agent tools can use to fetch P3P privacy policy 
automatically. 
 
The specification includes 
•  A standard vocabulary to describe a web site’s data practices 
•  A set of base data elements that web sites can refer to on their P3P policy  
•  A protocol for requesting and transmitting web site privacy policy. 
The P3P protocol is a simple extension to the HTTP protocol – it uses XML. However, the privacy 
specification language does not support implementation of the stated privacy policies. Moreover, it 
does not allow personalization of privacy policies and merely helps in specifying the generic 
privacy policy in a machine understandable form. P3P also does not provide enforcement. 
Furthermore, it does not include mechanisms for transferring data or for securing personal data in 
transit or storage. Intermediaries such as telecommunication providers, ISPs, proxies and others 
may be privy to the exchange of data between a site and a user, but their practices may not be 
governed by the site’s policies. 
  7 
In some cases, P3P vocabulary may not be precise enough to describe a website’s privacy 
practices. 
3.3  Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language  
In order to address the shortcomings of P3P, an enterprise privacy policy authorization language 
(EPAL) has been proposed by Schunter et al 0. 
 
An EPAL policy is essentially a list of privacy rules that are ordered with descending precedence 
(i.e., if a rule applies, subsequent rules are ignored). A rule is a statement that includes a ruling, a 
user category, an action, a data category, and a purpose. A rule may also contain conditions and 
obligations. Rules are used to determine if a request is allowed or denied. A request contains a user 
category, an action, a data category, and a purpose.  
 
Legislation and privacy policies may state that when a certain action is performed, the enterprise is 
obligated to take some additional steps. An example is that all accesses against a certain type of 
data for a given purpose must be logged. Or children's data shall be deleted within 30 days unless 
parent consent is obtained. In EPAL such consequential actions are called obligations. EPAL is not 
designed to encode the logic of an obligation. The system which evaluates a request against an 




4 Privacy  Middleware 
 
The PRIVDAM system described in this paper uses the log file from the privacy middleware 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
The privacy middleware ensures that all the data stored in the data repository adheres to the privacy 
policies that are stored in the Privacy database. Data requests are granted only when the EPAL 
based privacy policies match the characteristics of the request and the requestor.  
 
  8The architecture of the privacy middleware uses EPAL to store the privacy policy in XML format 
and the access requests also conform to EPAL. The entire transaction is then logged in the query 
log. This query log, along with some network data, is then utilized by PRIVDAM for constructing 
features that are used in the data mining analysis.  




























Figure 1: Architecture of Privacy Middleware 
4.1 Logging 
The PRIVDAM architecture operates on the privacy middleware log which is created whenever 
access is granted to some information.  
 
Logging is done via collating data from various sources. The log contains a feature set containing 
network attributes and privacy attributes. 
 
4.1.1  Network Attributes 
Network attributes include Network traffic data. Such data is collected using Netflow tools. 
Netflow tools capture only packet header information like source IP address and port number, 
destination IP address and port number, type of packet etc. These traffic flow data is stored in a flat 
file. 
  94.1.2  Privacy Attributes 
Privacy attributes are extracted from the data request and the corresponding applicable EPAL 
privacy policy. Privacy attributes include the action, purpose and data category. Moreover the login 
ID and number of records accessed are derived from the database access logs. 
 
5 Privacy  Violation  Detection and Monitoring  
As previously discussed in section 2.1, privacy violations can occur due to external hackers or from 
regular employees (we are ignoring misfeasors as PRIVDAM does not address this kind of privacy 
violation). In addition, section 2.2 describes the mechanisms that may be used to violate privacy. 
Privacy violations using each of these mechanisms will leave a signature or pattern in the privacy 
log file. These patterns or pattern deviations that arise from such violations are described in the 
following subsections. 
5.1  External Hackers (Access through Internet) 
This kind of attack involves hackers trying to break into the network through remotely logging on 
to the enterprise computers. We assume that the hackers are oblivious of the privacy policy and 
hence cannot change it. They can only masquerade as genuine employees of the organization and 
the following symptoms arise from such a possibility: 
 
1.  The source IP address and possibly the source port deviates from the usual enterprise intranet 
address. The hacker could certainly spoof her IP address, but that would require her to have 
prior information regarding the enterprise’s network configuration. 
2.  The access time pattern deviates from the normal access time patterns. 
3.  The purpose provided by the perpetrator deviates from the normal pattern of purposes provided 
by the actual authorized personnel. 
4.  The malicious codes like leeches that infect the system can cause unsupervised flow of data out 
of the computer. This will cause the number of records requested to go up drastically and 
possibly thousands of records might be requested at a time. This would deviate from the typical 
pattern of the number of records accessed in a single request. 
  105.2  Regular Employees (Access through Intranet) 
This scenario involves the employees tampering with their privacy policies and hence getting 
access to previously unauthorized data. This may includes the misfeasors that do not have to 
change their access rights but simply misuse their authority. The following cases arise: 
 
1.  The data category accessed deviates from the data category that the user normally accesses. For 
example, the log shows the nurse accessing the medical history of a patient whereas her 
previous access patterns show that she has never accessed medical history in the past.  
2.  The purpose and action could similarly be modified. This might result in the log showing the 
testers writing physician’s orders for treatment or some such other absurd possibility which 
does not have a precedence in the log pattern. 
3.  The time of access might be the same but the number of records requested might go up when 
an employee with malicious intent wants to read the records of all patients. 
4.  A combination of the above scenario might also result, e.g. the data category might change 
along with either action/purpose or time of access. All such combinations that can lead to 
privacy violation have been considered in our work. 
5.3 PRIVDAM  Methodology 
The proposed PRIVDAM system attempts to detect and monitor all the eight symptoms using 
clustering and data mining algorithms. However DoS attacks and NDA annulments are not 
considered for simplicity sake. This is largely due to the fact that if the organization itself cannot be 
trusted, then all auditing mechanisms are rendered irrelevant. 
 
PRIVDAM acts on the privacy log created by a Privacy Violation Prevention system like the one 
developed by Bhattacharya and Gupta [1]. Privacy Violation Prevention restricts access to privacy 
records in accordance with the privacy policies. The Privacy Violation Prevention is built into the 
privacy middleware [1].  
 
PRIVDAM operates on the principle of unsupervised anomaly detection approach using statistical 
methods. Data accesses are identified that are possibly illegal but were able to pass through the 
existing privacy violation prevention frameworks, in a manner similar to network intrusion and 
database hacking, as described in sections 5.1 and 5.2.  
 
  11Consequently, there is a pressing need to have a PRIVDAM approach that is able to generate 
access patterns that are definitely normal and access patterns that are definitely not normal. Such an 
approach would necessitate the definition of what constitutes definitely normal and definitely not 
normal. 
 
PRIVDAM requires the generation of positive and negative access patterns, and since we do not 
have any existing sources, we need to bootstrap the pattern generation process. If there were one or 
two existing patterns, then one could have followed an approach of using the existing patterns to 
filter the transactions that are potentially normal or not normal and then could have performed data 
mining on them to generate patterns that a human privacy analyst could have investigated. 
However, unlike in the case of network intrusion detection where intrusion traffic patterns already 
exist, the PRIVDAM approach has no existing patterns and hence bootstrapping is necessary.  
 
Also, the attempt is not only detecting privacy violations but also to prevent future privacy 
violation using the definitely not normal access patterns. Hence, the system needs to be a Privacy 
Violation Detection and Monitoring System (PRIVDAM). 
 
The process of detecting privacy violations can be categorized into two parts 0: (a) collection and 
organization of anomalous data that potentially documents privacy violations and (b) analysis of 
the anomalous data to look for potential privacy violation patterns.  
 
Anomaly detection requires that a profile of a normal behavior is generated, and that a certain 
threshold or a statistical deviation from this normal profile is defined such that deviations larger 
than the threshold are labeled as potentially anomalous and hence possibly a privacy violation.   
 
A policy-based detection approach requires that the log is compared to a defined machine readable 
privacy policy such as EPAL 0.  
 
The proposed PRIVDAM approach uses clustering of the privacy log data to find outliers that 
correspond to access to privacy-constrained data. The approach is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Privacy Violation Detection and Monitoring (PRIVDAM) approach using Clustering and 
Data mining 
 
The input to the system is the Query Log from the Privacy middleware (ref Figure 1). This query 
log forms the base on which the violations are sought to be detected. 
5.4 Feature  Extraction 
The first step in PRIVDAM is extracting the features that are to be used in the data mining 
analysis. As described in section 4.1, the feature set consists of network features and privacy 
features. The network features include time of access, source IP address, source port, destination IP 
address and destination port. The privacy features are extracted from EPAL request to obtain user 
category, action, purpose, data category, privacy policy id used . These features are especially 
useful for identifying irregular data access. 
 
Once the feature extraction has been done, the feature set is compared with the known violation 
patterns to remove the previously known perpetrators. This step reduces the overheads on the 
system. This feature set is then compared with existing known definitely acceptable patterns and 
the matching sets are removed. Initially, since there are no patterns of either known privacy 
violations or known acceptable patterns, hence this step has no impact and the system bootstraps 
itself without any patterns. 
  135.5  Mining Distance based Outliers 
An outlier is defined as follows; provided with user defined parameters p and D, and a distance 
function F, an object O in a dataset T is said to be an outlier if at least fraction p of the objects in T 
lie greater than distance D from O. 0
 
During the next step the feature set is provided to the PRIVDAM anomaly detection module that 
uses a clustering based outlier detection algorithm. This module searches for deviation from the 
normal patterns and assigns an anomaly score to each data access log entry.  
  
PRIVDAM adopted an outlier detection algorithm for anomaly detection since it had provided 
superlative results in the case of intrusion detection systems 0.  
 
We used the data mining tool Orca 00  for discovering outliers. It uses the distance from a given 
example to its nearest neighbor to determine its unusualness. Outliers can be viewed as candidates 
who have a low nearest neighbor density. 
5.6  Association Pattern Analysis using BDFS(b) 
While the improvement of detection rate and reduction of false alarms is an important objective but 
the task cannot be limited to this if the data collated is very large. It becomes impracticable for 
analysis of hundreds of violations that might get detected. 
For this purpose, we have used BDFS(b) [22], a frequent pattern mining algorithm for finding out 
the most frequent rules occurring among the parameters of the feature set (described in section 6.1), 
above the user-defined support and confidence. BDFS(b) is a frequent pattern mining algorithm for 
association rule mining, based on a novel combination of the staged search and the depth first 
search [36]. As a result, it has the merits of both best-first search and the depth-first-branch-and-
bound (DFBB) search [37], and at the same time, avoids bad features of both. Thus this algorithm 
introduces a new search strategy, not limited entirely to breadth-first or depth-first search, and 
explores the given search space in stages. When we can assign specific merit to a pattern depending 
on the particular context, BDFS(b) has the ability to ensure that patterns of higher merit will be 
preferred over those of comparatively lesser merits. This ensures that we can come up with 
interesting meritorious patterns faster, which in turn will help us reacting to them efficiently for 
better decision making. 
 
  14Hence, after detection of the outliers, which are possible privacy intrusions, PRIVDAM runs an 
association rule data mining on the outliers to generate the patterns of potential violations. 
 
 
Let T be the set of log entries and A be the set of attributes defined over T. For example A consists 
of {action, purpose, login id, data category}. Let I be a set of attribute-values pair defined over A. 
For example I= {action= “read”, purpose= “diagnosis”, login id=15, data category = “patient 
history”}. Each attribute-value pair is termed an item. Subsets of I are called itemsets.  
Association rules are defined between two disjoint itemsets X and Y as: 
X->Y(c,s) 
Where c is the confidence and s is the support value for the rule  
 
The PRIVDAM association pattern analysis module summarizes data accesses that are ranked 
highly anomalous in the anomaly detection module. An association rules aims at finding interesting 
intra-relationship within a single log entry. 
 
The outcome of the association pattern analysis is presented to a human privacy analyst who then 
decides if the patterns are indeed indicative of privacy violations and hence  decides whether these 
summaries are helpful in creating new rules that may be further used in the known violation 
detection module. Thus one can start with no known patterns and the process will bootstrap. 
 
Once a set of patterns is known, PRIVDAM uses these patterns for the monitoring of potential 
privacy violations. When a data access request comes, its features are extracted and compared with 
known privacy violation patterns. If the patterns match, then the request is blocked else the request 
is granted. However, as discussed in Sub section 2.2 even if the request is granted, the request may 
still actually be a privacy violation. 
 
Depending on the privacy sensitivity of the organization and the data, the access may be granted, 
but in order to detect potential violation pattern in the future, the output of the check against known 
privacy violation patterns is fed into the known acceptable patterns. Here the organization has to 
keep in mind the impact of not providing the data e.g. denial of data access to a genuine doctor in a 
hospital due to a false alarm might cause irremediable harm. 
 
  15PRIVDAM operates on the data collected on a particular machine rather than the traffic relating to 




We take the case of a health care information system based on the work of Krekke 0. We extend 
the case to our PRIVDAM architecture and then present the results in the next section.  
 
The medical information system is especially privacy sensitive due to the fact that patient 
information collated at health care centers is highly confidential in nature and any leakage of 
medical information can be highly damaging to an individual. For example, an individual inflicted 
with AIDS may not want his employer and colleagues to know about his or her medical status as it 
may compromise the individual’s quality of life. Moreover, medical records were subjected to 
some of the earliest privacy legislations and standards like HIPAA. 
 
Personnel working at the health care center, using the medical information system deployed in the 
health care center, can access patients’ personal identifiable information (PII) for treatment and 
diagnosis. In our simplified case, we categorize medical workers into the following categories of 
actors: receptionists, nurses, testers and doctors who all have predefined roles. The privacy policy 
of the hospital can be implemented using EPAL 0 or similar constructs. The data-categories, 
actions and purposes in the medical policy are explained using Table 1. 
 
Each column specifies the action, purpose and data category of each user. The purposes are 
treatment (t), diagnosis (d), localization (l), registration (r) and testing (te), and only two actions, 
read (r) or write (w) are allowed. 
This privacy policy is enforced by the means of a privacy broker [1], but as we have already 
discussed, it is not sufficient as privacy violations might still crop up. Therefore we need to have a 
PRIVDAM system to operate on the privacy log. 
 
  16Table 1 Authorization matrix 
Data Category  Doctor  Nurse  Tester Receptionist 
Patient  id  data      r(t),w(t) 
Contact data  r(d,t), 
w(d,t)  r(t)   r(l),w(r) 
Medical history  r(d,t), 
w(d,t)      
Physician’s order  r(d,t), 
w(d,t)  r(t)    
Progress notes  r(d,t), 
w(d,t)      
Depart-mental Reports  r(d,t), 














Nursing data  r(d,t), 
w(d,t) 
w(t), 
r(t)    
Operative reports  r(d,t), 
w(d,t)      
Discharge Summary  r(d,t), 









6.1  Feature Set of Privacy Log 
The created log, as discussed in section 4.1, contains the following attributes: 
  Time: The access time of the user converted in seconds. 
  Src_ip: IP address of the source computer that has initiated the request. 
  Dest_ip: IP address of the destination computer that has the data stored. 
  Src_port: Port number of the source computer. 
  Dest_port: Port number of the host where the requests are terminated. 
  Login_id: The unique id of the hospital employees. 
  Number of records requested from the database.  
  Action: This is extracted from the EPAL request and can be either read or write depending on 
the type of request. 
  Purpose: Another feature extracted from the EPAL request and possesses a predefined value as 
stated above. 
  Data category: The category type of data requested by the user. 
  Weekday/ Weekend: This aspect reflects whether access is being carried out on weekends. 
 
The first six attributes are continuous in nature and the next five are categorical attributes, which 
after transformation, are converted into ordinal values. For example, read was assigned a value of 0 
and write was given 1 in the action attribute. Similarly, the data category was numbered from 1-9 
in the increasing probability of them resulting in a privacy violation.  
  176.2  Simulation of Data 
Synthetic network datasets like the Darpa’99 0 and KDDCup’99 data sets are publicly available. 
Similarly, real life network data is also easily available. However these data sets are known to 
possess serious limitations 00and moreover real life data containing features required for our 
PRIVDAM system is not obtainable beforehand as there are no dataset of acceptable quality 
available for privacy violation. Hence a synthetic dataset was created 0 using the Information 
Exploration Shootout 0 and privacy characteristics were appended using extensive simulation.  
 
A total of sixteen employees were considered to be working at the hospital. Each user possessed a 
normal, privacy violation free access pattern and 400, 000 such records were simulated. Statistics 
for one month of access was simulated, the details of which are listed in Table 2. The action and 
purpose fields conform to the privacy policy previously defined. 
 
The simulated data is temporally skewed in terms of the number of log entries due to the fact that 
the day shift employee encounter more patients than the off hour employees. Similarly, the 
disparity in the number of records requested between the receptionists and the testers can be 
attributed to the fact that receptionists need to view the information of already registered patients 
when registering new patients. However, the tester is usually treating only one patient at a given 
point in time and is not required to access any other data. 
6.3  Probable Privacy Violations 
The various symptoms that our architecture attempts to detect have been discussed thoroughly in 
Section 5. Anomalous data was simulated for each of the case and the various log entries were 
appended to the synthetic normal behavior. 10,000 such entries were created and distributed 
randomly in the normal data set. 
Apart from possible violations, some probable false alarms such as doctors accessing patient 
records from their homes for treatment or diagnosis were simulated. Moreover, the advising 











7  Evaluation of Results 
 
This section describes the results obtained by applying the PRIVDAM methodology to the 
synthetic dataset. The architecture had no data labeled as good or bad data and the system 
bootstrapped with no existing patterns. 
7.1 Anomaly  Detection  Module 
The distance based outlier algorithm was run on the given dataset of 410,000 and it resulted in all 
the log entries being correctly assigned an outlier factor. The dataset had 10,000 records arising out 
of privacy violations. Each of the columns was normalized using their standard deviation so that 
the calculation of distances is not skewed in favor of attributes possessing large values. Clustering 
was done to extract the top n outliers in the dataset where the value of n was varied for different 
results. 
 
The cases simulated in section 6.2, were found to be assigned the highest scores by the anomaly 
detection module and consequently detected successfully. Sample attacks are shown in Table 3.  
Although all of the attributes are part of the clustering, only those attributes which have 
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Some false alarms were encountered due to larger variation of some normal records as compared to 
the anomalous ones. Figure 3 shows the comparison of the accuracy of captured attacks v/s the 
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Figure 3 Comparison Study 
 
The value of accuracy is calculated as: 
 
Accuracy=Number of detected Outliers/Total number of Outliers 
 
  20The two different plots are drawn by varying the value of ‘n’ during the mining of the top ‘n’ 
outliers. 
We notice that the accuracy improves as a result of increasing the value of ‘n’ but there is tradeoff 
that exists between accuracy and false alarms, which has to be taken into account. 
Figure 4 shows the outliers scatter plot along the login-id and time, with outliers marked. 
 
 
Figure 4 Visualization of outliers 
7.2  Summarization through association rules  
In the next step the highest ranked outliers were passed through the associative mining algorithm to 
find interesting patterns and summarize the results. 
 
The frequent item sets of various lengths were generated along with their support value. In this 
section we report some of the highest ranked patterns generated by PRIVDAM on the outliers: 
 
  {Src_ip=61.16.215.75, Src_port=21, Number of records = 481, Login_id=6} (s=521) 
 
This pattern indicates an intrusion attempt by a source computer having the specified IP address 
and port number. It requests a large number of records and has a big support value s as well, which 
makes the pattern more interesting to the analyst. 
 
  {Data category= “Contact data”, Purpose= “Treatment”, Login_id=13} (s=376) 
  21 
The pattern above implies an unusual behavior where an advising doctor is accessing the contact 
data of patients for treatment. The support value is also quite high to warrant a possible violation. 
 
  {Action= “Read”, Number of records = 2304, Weekend, Login_id=3 } (s=457) 
 
The pattern indicates an unusually large data reads on the weekend. The employee is a receptionist 
and it might be a false alarm with the access being normal. 
 
  {Data category = “Medical history” , Purpose = “Registration” , Login_id = 16} (s=472) 
 
This pattern implies a violation and the access rights of the surgeon must be revoked immediately. 
The purpose of registration is not included in the privacy policy of the hospital relating to the 
specified personnel. 
 
Hence PRIVDAM methodology is able to successfully produce meaningful summarizations of 
possible privacy violations allowing it to be used by a human analyst to partially automate privacy 
violation detection. 
 
8  Conclusion and Future work 
 
In this paper, we have introduced the PRIVDAM methodology that uses intelligent data mining 
techniques for detecting privacy violations. The approach taken by PRIVDAM allows 
bootstrapping of the privacy violation detection. Experimental evaluations show that our proposed 
methodology performed significantly well and at larger ratios of normal to anomalous data, it 
detected all the anomalous records.  
 
However, the methodology has the limitation of not being able to detect privacy attacks like those 
of DoS, slow scanning and multiple location attacks. Moreover, unsupervised learning techniques 
are best suited for unlabeled data having high dimensionality and huge volume. The low percentage 
of violations among total logged data renders standard data mining techniques to be of lesser use. 
We propose to employ other algorithms for their efficacy in a future work.  
 
  22An interesting scenario that PRIVDAM can successfully detect is when the pattern of reads and 
writes can have anomalous behavior. Say for example, a doctor would normally have a couple of 
read accesses onto a patient’s medical history and then a single write to update the diagnosis and 
prescription. However, if a masquerader attempts to access the data as a doctor, he could simply 
make reads and no writes. Since this would lead to a variation in the privacy log pattern, it can 
potentially be captured by PRIVDAM. Looking at similar cases, a couple of domain-dependant 
heuristics can be designed as well, that will make the proposed PRIVDAM methodology more 
accurate and robust for privacy violation detections. The fully-developed PRIVDAM system can 
go a long way if some good visualizations techniques are also provided as an aid for better 
comprehension of suspicious behavior captured by our system.  
 
Appreciating the huge amount of automated data traffic being encountered in any organization, a 
number of steps of efficient querying and aggregation of attributes must be carried out efficiently. 
We wish to extend in a future work by incorporating these various optimization techniques as well. 
For better summaries and efficient pruning of insignificant rules, we also propose to try using 
frequent episode rules [30], by only considering the axis and reference attributes while 
summarizing the attacks.  
 
A major significance of the work will be felt when we can extend PRIVDAM for real-time (or 
near-real-time) privacy violation detection. Considering the main proponents of privacy, that 
information once leaked into the wrong hands it is impossible to be undone, we plan to extend the 
current PRIVDAM methodology to react in real-time.  
 
We hope that this paper will encourage more work on privacy violation detection and will promote 
developments of various intelligent machine learning techniques for fast and accurate detection of 
privacy violations. 
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